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Abstract 
Tension and confrontation between riparian states over planned measures are 
likely to occur in the absence of an inclusive legal framework governing the 
utilization, management, and conservation of transboundary watercourses. The 
construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), 2011, has re-
ignited the tension on the use and share of the riparian countries over the Nile 
River. Egypt and Sudan have demanded notification of the project, the 
provision of all available information, and the time for the responses (to these 
questions) before Ethiopia continues with the construction of the GERD. 
However, Ethiopia has rejected the request for prior notification as a pre-
condition for commencing the GERD project.  As a result, Ethiopia and its 
downstream neighbours, particularly Egypt, have entered into various forms of 
consultations and negotiations due to concerns over the impact of the GERD. 
This article examines whether Ethiopia is under an international obligation not 
to implement the GERD without notifying and consulting Egypt and Sudan and 
whether the ongoing consultations and negotiations emanate from a legal 
obligation or mere confidence-building measures. The author argues that 
Ethiopia has no obligation (under international treaty obligations and 
customary international law on transboundary waters) to provide notification of 
planned measures such as GERD and engage in consultations. 
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Introduction 
Various international principles and laws regulate transboundary water 
resources and disputes. Many of the international watercourses principles either 
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prescribe the substantive rights and obligations of riparian states or formulate 
procedural means to enforce rights and obligations. One of the procedural rights 
that is widely getting acceptance among many watercourse states is the principle 
of notification and consultation on planned measures along international 
watercourses. The principle of notification and consultation on planned measures 
is embodied in many international1 as well as regional agreements.2 It has also 
been widely considered as a subject-matter of the works of international 
organizations3 and decisions of international courts4 of arbitration. Various 
scholars5 have written articles and books on the subject.   
In spite of attempts to codify and reach at some level of clarity with regard to 
the core procedural content of the principles, there remain continuous disputes 
among riparian states whenever any new plan is envisaged or an existing plan is 
either modified or altered. The Nile watercourse is an example whereby riparian 
countries are sharply divided on the content, scope and implications of planned 
measures. The GERD, currently under construction in western Ethiopia on the 
Blue Nile River has become contentious from the preliminary phase.6 
Undoubtedly, GERD is regarded as an important part of the strategic 
hydropower development plan in Ethiopia.7   
                                           
1 The most comprehensive international agreement that deals with notification and 
consultation is Law of the Non-Navigation Uses of International Watercourses (1997) 
(hereinafter the Watercourse Convention). There are also bilateral and multilateral 
international agreements that deal with the same subject matter. See also The 1954 
convention between the former Yugoslavia and Austria concerning water economic 
question relating to the Drava River, Indus River Treaty (IWT) between India and 
Pakistan, The 1973 Treaty concerning the Rio de la Plata and its corresponding Maritime 
Boundary  adopted by Uruguay and Argentina, The 1995 Mekong River agreement, and  
the India-Nepal Mahaail treaty of 1996. 
2 South African Development Community (SADC) on August 23, 1995 (The revised 
protocol on shared watercourse), Senegal River Water Charter and the Nile Basin 
Cooperative Framework Agreement (herein after called CFA).   
3 See Helsinki Rules of 1966 (later substituted by the Berlin Rules of 2004) on the Uses of 
the Water of International Rivers developed by International Law Association, a private 
non-governmental institution and the internal guideline of the World Bank Policy on a 
fund in relation to developmental projects along international watercourses.   
4 See Lake Lanoux Arbitration (1957), Spain vs France, and Indus Waters Kishenganga 
Arbitration.  
5 Authors such as Stephen McCaffrey, and many others have written extensive academic 
works on notification and consultation along international watercourses.  
6 Ying Zhang, Solomon Tassew Erkyihum & Paul Block (2016),  Filling the GERD: 
evaluating hydroclimatic variability and impoundment strategies for Blue Nile riparian 
countries, Water International, 41:4, 593-610,  
   DOI: 10.1080/02508060.2016.1178467, p. 593. 
7 WWAP (2012), Managing water under uncertainty and risk the United Nations world 
water development report. Paris: UNESCO in Ying Zhang et al, supra note 6, p.593. 
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The announcement of the inauguration of the construction of the GERD 
project was met by a fierce objection from the lower downstream riparian states 
mainly Egypt, and with some concerns by the Sudanese government. In this 
regard, a question that is worth noting is whether Ethiopia is under an 
international obligation to consult Egypt and Sudan in order to implement the 
GERD. Another related question is whether Ethiopia has the right to implement 
the GERD during the period of consultation and negotiation. Furthermore, it is 
important to investigate whether Ethiopia’s current engagement in the on-going 
consultations and negotiations regarding GERD emanates from a legal 
obligation or a mere confidence building measure. The purpose of this article is 
to address these questions with reference to the relevant international 
instruments and customary international law. 
The first section deals with the justification for a riparian state’s duty to 
inform and consult on planned measures along an international watercourse. The 
second section focuses on notification and consultation on planned measures 
under customary international law as well as bilateral and multilateral water 
treaties. Section 3 discusses the duty to notify and consult under the 
Watercourse Convention. Section four examines the treaty regime applicable to 
Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt as well as their respective state practices with regard 
to notification and consultation. The last section deals with the application of the 
principles along with its challenges in the context of GERD.  
1. The Need for Riparian Duty to Inform and Consult on 
Planned Measures  
Allocating shared waters in a manner acceptable to all parties is one of the most 
difficult aspects of transboundary water negotiations. These negotiations should 
establish a clear process through consultation as a step to determine benefit 
allocations, ‘an obligation to notify when new water needs arise, a requirement 
for co-riparian to consent to any increased water use and prioritization of water 
uses’.8 In this connection, the most important and controversial component of 
any water negotiation is the duty to notify and consult 9 on planned measures on 
international watercourses. The obligation of the co-riparian states to inform and 
                                           
8 Kishor Uprety & Salman M. A. Salman (2011), Legal aspects of sharing and management 
of transboundary waters in South Asia: preventing conflicts and promoting cooperation, 
Hydrological Sciences Journal, 56:4, 641-661, DOI: 10.1080/02626667.2011.576252, p. 
659.  
9 The duty to notify and consult have different meaning and scope.  The difference between 
‘notification’ and ‘prior consultation’ is that the former simply involves notifying other 
riparian states, while the latter obliges riparian states to have a dialogue. See Kyungmee 
Kim, Sustainable Development in Trans-boundary Water Resource Management. A case 
study of the Mekong River Basin, Uppsala University, p. 18.   
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notify each other prior to implementing or taking any action has become a 
recognized rule of customary international law.10 This rule finds its roots in the 
principle of the duty to cooperate in international law. It has been noted that 
international river basins demand the cooperation of the states, which comprise 
them.11 Such states need to work together if the full benefits of the sustainable 
development and use of watercourses are to be realized by the ‘whole basin 
community’.12  
An effective system of notification and consultation offers a vital means by 
which states can communicate and peacefully ‘reconcile any competing 
interests’ over their planned uses of an international watercourse.13 Such 
procedures benefit all states. The planning state is able to effectively determine 
the likely impacts of its plans within other states and perhaps even adjust where 
necessary.14 Good communication with potentially affected states will also put a 
planning state’s proposal on a stronger footing. The planning state will be able 
to demonstrate that its decision was founded upon a legitimate process, whereby 
all concerns were considered meaningfully, and there was a deliberate and 
transparent process by which to adhere to international legal requirements.15 
States that are likely to be affected by planned projects also benefit from such 
process. They will benefit from a forum with clear guidelines where they can 
raise and discuss their concerns, and they will have access to the data and 
information required to make ‘informed decisions over any likely impacts’.16  
Moreover, consultation was justified by some international lawyers on the 
ground that ‘it ensures that a state will not utilize the waters of an international 
drainage basin without examining all the factors involved’.17 By consulting 
                                           
10 This principle was considered by many international treaties such as the Danube Basin 
Agreement, 1987; the Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes 1992. 
11 Mohammed Sameh (2003), Diversion of International Watercourses under International 
Law, African Yearbook of International Laws, 109-179, African Foundation for 
International Law, p. 159.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Alistair Rieu-Clarke (2014), Notification and Consultation on Planned Measures 
Concerning International Watercourse: Learning Lessons from the Pulp Mills and 
Kishenganga Cases, Oxford University Press, p. 103 available at:  
http://yielaw.oxfordjournals.org (accessed on November 30, 2016) citing AT Wolf, SB 
Yoffe, and M Giordano, International Waters: Identifying Basins at Risk 5 (1) Water 
Policy 29 (2003) p. 104. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16  Stephen McCaffrey, Third Report on the Law of the Non-Navigation Uses of 
International Watercourses 2 YB Intl L Comm’n 16 at para 61 (1987) in Alistair Rieu-
Clarke (2014), supra note 13, p. 104. 
17 Mohamed S. Amr (2003), supra note 11, p. 163.  
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other states, a nation may discover ‘another course of action’, which is more 
beneficial to all the parties affected, or, at the very least, ascertain the ‘legal 
ramifications of its proposed actions’.18 
The obligations of notification by planned measures impose on upstream and 
downstream basin states the duty to exchange data and information about the 
possible adverse effect of the planned measures.19 This planned measure can 
involve major projects such as constructing dams or programs of a minor nature, 
which can be planned and implemented by the public or private sector. Any 
planned measure, which may have an adverse effect on the condition of basin 
states, requires exchanging accurate data and information about them. This 
effect can be beneficial or adverse. However, the ‘adverse should be 
significantly lower than that of significant harm to avoid it’. 20 
The obligation of prior notification can be during the ‘preliminary stages of 
the planning phase’ of any planned activity.21 The state that purports to 
authorize such action is placed under an obligation to notify all potentially 
affected states of its plans.  
The duty to notify and consult applies to upstream and downstream countries. 
Nonetheless, it is widely believed that notification and consultation have 
substance with regard to planned measures taken by upstream riparian states. 
Especially, many downstream countries focus on the obligation not to cause 
harm and require that they have the right to be notified of any activity of the 
upstream to ensure that such activity would not harm their interests. 22 Most 
downstream riparians believe that this is ‘a unilateral requirement and does not 
apply to upstream riparians’ and they consider it as the ‘exclusive right of 
                                           
18 C. Bourne, “Procedures in the Development of International Drainage Basins: The Duty to 
Consult and Negotiate”, Canadian Yearbook of International Law 10 (1972), p. 230 in 
Mohamed S. Amr (2003), supra note 11, p. 163.   
19 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non- Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses and Commentaries Thereto and Resolution on 
Transboundary Confined Groundwater Ground, 1994 U.N.Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 97 
(1994); International Law Association in T Sayed Mohamed shaarawy (2016), the Role of 
Customary International Water Law in Settling Water Disputes by Mediation: An 
Examination of the Indus River and Renaissance Dam Disputes, the American University 
in Cairo, Egypt, p.19   
20  Ibid. 
21 Ilias Plakokefalos, Prevention Obligations in International Environmental Law, Research 
Paper Series, Amsterdam Center for International Law,  available at <www.acil.uva.nl> , 
p.4.  
22  Salman M.A. Salman (2010), Downstream riparians can also harm upstream riparians: 
the concept of foreclosure of future uses, International Water, 35:4, 350-364, DOI: 
10.1080/02508060.2010.508160, p.351. 
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downstream riparians’.23  According to this view, downstream riparians do not 
need to notify upstream riparians of any project –they are undertaking or plan to 
undertake– because such project or activity cannot possibly harm the upstream 
riparians.24 The justification provided is that ‘since the water has already left the 
lands of the upstream riparian; so how can that upstream be harmed or even 
affected’? 25 This view fails to give due attention to the prospective water 
resource uses of upper riparians. There is thus a growing literature and 
development of a new concept called ‘foreclosure of rights’, that all the riparian 
states (irrespective of their geographical location) are under a duty to notify and 
consult on planned measures.   
2.  Notification and Consultation on Planned Measures under 
International Watercourse Law  
The issue of notification and consultation on planned measures is present in a 
number of conventions, albeit in varying forms. It is equally applied in the 
context of environmental law and international watercourse laws. Its 
applications have different genesis.  However, it is not within the scope of this 
article to deal with notification and consultation in the context of environmental 
laws. Thus, this article focuses on notification and consultation in the relevant 
treaty practices of states and customary international law. The relevant state 
treaty practices which take the form of bilateral and multilateral agreements are 
put in chronological order. Whereas, claims for the existence of customary 
international law are drawn from cases and soft law instruments established over 
the years.   
2.1 Treaties and conventions 
The riparian duty to inform on planned measures is included in the 1954 
convention between the former Yugoslavia and Austria concerning water 
economic question relating to the Drava River.26 Article IV of the Drava River 
Convention envisages that ‘Austria, the upper riparian state shall when seriously 
contemplating plans for new installations to divert from the Drava basin or for 
construction work which might affect the Drava river regime to the detriment of 
Yugoslavia, undertake to discuss such plans with the Federal People’s Republic 
and lower riparian states’. 
                                           
23 Ibid.   
24 Ibid.   
25 Ibid.   
26 Convention between Yugoslavia and Austria concerning water economy questions 
relating to the Drava, signed at Geneva on 25 May 1954: art. 4 (United Nations, Treaty 
Series, Vol. 227, p.MI; Legislative Texts, p. 513, No.144; document A/5409, para. 697. 
Notification and Consultation of Projects in Transboundary Water Resources …               131 
 
 
India and Pakistan had also entered into an international watercourse treaty 
agreement known as ‘the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT)’, 1960.  Article IV of the 
IWT sets the basic principles of water management by India and Pakistan, 
primarily through no harm (Art. IV (9)) and prior information about 
developments.27 Article VII Section 2 specifically requires either party to notify 
the other if it plans to construct any engineering work that would cause 
interference or affect materially the other Party.28 The IWT also provides that 
‘either Party may request the [Permanent] Court [of Arbitration] . . ., pending its 
Award, such interim measures as … are necessary to safeguard its interests under 
the Treaty with respect to the matter in dispute, or to avoid prejudice to the final 
solution or aggravation or extension of the dispute’.29 Overall, IWT is elaborate 
in its provisions for prior notification of planned measures, permission, 
concessions and restrictions.30  
Another important bilateral treaty where notification and consultation have 
been given emphasis is the 1973 Treaty concerning the Rio de la Plata and its 
corresponding Maritime Boundary adopted by Uruguay and Argentina. The 
treaty stipulates that both riparians may construct works or channels or modify 
existing ones in both the shared waters as well as the coastal belts, jointly or 
individually.31 Pursuant to the treaty ‘a party planning the construction of new 
channels, the substantial modification or alteration to existing  ones or the 
execution of any other works of such magnitude as to affect navigation or  the 
regime of the river, shall so inform the Commission’.32  Thus, whenever either 
party wishes to undertake such work, it must follow the established procedures 
by notifying the Administrative Commission.33  
The Administrative Commission will then decide within a period of thirty 
days whether the project may cause significant damage to the navigation 
interests of the other party, or the river's regime.34 Should the Commission 
decide that ‘the project may potentially cause harm or have damaging effects, it 
shall notify the other party, who may raise objections on technical grounds and 
                                           
27 Annexure D(9) of the Indus water Treaty.  
28 Mary Miner , Gauri Patankar, Shama Gamkhar & David J. Eaton (2009) Water sharing 
between India and Pakistan: a critical evaluation of the Indus Water Treaty, Water 
International, 34:2, 204-216, DOI: 10.1080/02508060902902193, p.206. 
29 Annexure G(28) Indus Water Treaty.  
30 Annexure C–E Indus Water Treaty. 
31 See article 12, paragraph 1 of the Treaty between Uruguay and Argentina concerning the 
Rio De la Plata and the Corresponding Maritime Boundary 19 November 1973 
(hereinafter Rio de la Plata Treaty) available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20691236> 
(accessed on 14-02-2017).    
32 Id., Art. 17.   
33 Id., Art. 17 to 22.   
34 Id., Art. 17, paragraph 1. 
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suggest the necessary modifications to the proposed project or operations’.35 In 
this notification, the essential aspects of the project must be described and, if 
necessary, the notification also states the mode of operation and other technical 
data which will permit the notified party to make an assessment of ‘the probable 
effects of the work might have on navigation or on river policy’.36 If the Parties 
do not reach an agreement according to the procedure stated above, Chapter IV 
on conflict resolution shall be applied to the case.37 
The duty of notification and consultation of planned measurers has also been 
acknowledged in multilateral treaty agreements such as the 1995 ‘Mekong River 
agreement’.38 The Mekong River agreement requires that timely information by 
a riparian on its proposed use of the water shall be submitted to the Mekong 
River Joint Committee.39 The agreement allows other riparians to discuss and 
evaluate the impact of the proposed use upon their uses of water and any other 
effects, which is the basis for arriving at an agreement. However, the duty of 
prior consultation does not give the other riparian states to veto and stop the 
proposed planned measure.  
Procedural mechanisms established under the 1995 Mekong Agreement have 
been further developed by the Mekong River Commission in which it adopted a 
procedural document for notification, prior consultation and agreement on 
November 12, 2002. The document establishes the procedures to be applied by 
the Mekong basin states in the case of planned measures defined as ‘any 
proposal for a definite use of the waters of the Mekong river system by any 
riparian, excluding domestic and minor uses of water not having a significant 
impact on mainstream flows’.40 This definition ‘involves any kind of water 
retention and diversion for the purposes of electricity, irrigation, and flood 
management’.41     
According to the Mekong Agreement, ‘notification’ is required on 
development projects on a tributary in the national territory, and ‘prior 
                                           
35  Id., Art. 17, paragraph 2.   
36  Id., Art. 17, paragraph 3.   
37 Lilian Del Casillo Laborde (1996), Legal Regime of the Rio de la Plata, Natural 
Resources Journal, Vol. 36  p.1 available at Hein online (accessed on  Feb 14 08:23:59  
2017). 
38  Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong river 
basin 5 April 1995, available at:   
     <www.mrcmekong.org/assets/publications/policies/Agreemnt.April 19.pdf> , accessed 
on 24-March-2017 (hereinafter called the Mekong River Agreement).  
39  Mekong River Agreement, Art. 26. 
40  See Article 1 of the definitional part of the ‘proposed use’ Mekong River Commission, 
Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation, and Agreement, (hereinafter the Mekong 
River Commission).   
41  See Art. 4.1.2 of the 1995 Mekong River agreement Commission.  
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consultation’ is required in two specific cases of (1) inter-basin diversions from 
the mainstream during the wet season; and (2) intra-basin uses on the 
mainstream during the dry season which can only be applicable to stretches of 
the mainstream that flow within a state’s national territory.42 Therefore, a 
riparian state is required to notify dam constructions in their national territory 
but it does not mean Mekong River Commission necessarily has to open a 
dialogue about the project. In the Council, a unanimous vote is required to make 
a decision and this procedure protects national self-interest of riparian states 
because any riparian state can cast a vote against it.43  
Another important treaty that restricts unilateral development projects and 
requires notification, consultation, and agreement, is the India-Nepal Mahaail 
treaty of 1996. It states that ‘any project to be developed on the Mahakali River, 
where it is a boundary river, should be designed and implemented by an 
agreement between the parties on the principles established by the treaty’.44 
Hence, it is an obligation for either party to reach an agreement before 
commencing any project on the Mahakali River.45 It discourages the unilateral 
development of the river and approves the principles of cooperation, 
consultation and notification.46  
Moreover, the South African Development Community (SADC), signed in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, by fourteen members (August 23, 1995) makes a 
clear reference to the duty of notification.47 The revised protocol on shared 
watercourse in the SADC that was signed on August 2000 embodies provisions 
that require ‘a riparian to notify other states of any planned measures of utmost 
urgency originating within its territory’.48 Article 4(1) of the revised protocol 
concerning planned measures is a reiteration articles 11 to 19 of the UN 
Convention on Watercourses. It contains notification concerning planned 
                                           
42 Sneddon, C. and Fox, C. 2006. Rethinking Transboundary Waters: A critical hydro-
politics of the Mekong basin. Political Geography, 25, 181-202   in Kyungmee Kim, supra 
note 9,  p. 18.   
43  Kyungmee Kim, Sustainable Development in Trans-boundary Water Resource 
Management, A case study of the Mekong River Basin, Uppsala University, p. 18.   
44  Kishor Uprety & Salman M. A. Salman (2011), Legal aspects of sharing and 
management of transboundary waters in South Asia: preventing conflicts and promoting 
cooperation, Hydrological Sciences Journal, 56:4, 641-661, DOI: 
10.1080/02626667.2011.576252, p.653. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Ibid. 
47  South African Development Community (SADC), Johannesburg (28 Aus 1995), the 
Convention on Shared Watercourse System in the Region.  
48  South African Development Community (SADC), Johannesburg (August 2000), revised 
protocol on shared watercourse in the SADC, Art 4 (1) (herein after called the SADC 
revised protocol). 
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measures with possible adverse effects, period for reply to notification, 
obligations of the notifying state during the period for reply to notification, 
absence of reply to notification, consultation and negotiations concerning 
planned measures, procedures in the absence of notification, and urgent 
implementation of planned measures.49  
Similarly, the duty of notification is embodied in the Senegal River Water 
Charter (in force since March 11, 1972), which was established in response to 
droughts, and to meet the economic needs of the riparian states of Mali, 
Mauritania, and Senegal.50 This instrument creates a system for decision making 
for the Senegal River basin, a formal structure of consultation and coordination 
among the Member States.51 The three states agreed to the principles of equitable 
utilization, coordinated development, and prior notification in the 1972 
Conventions.  
A revised Senegal River treaty was concluded by Mali, Mauritania, and 
Senegal in May 2002; and Guinea became a party to it in 2006. The 2002 Water 
Charter maintains the same core institutions of the 1972 Convention. It also 
clarifies the river projects that require approval and indicates the notification 
process for such projects.52 Article 4 of the Charter enumerates a number of 
principles for allocation of the waters of the Senegal River among the riparians. 
These principles include, among other things, ‘the obligation of each riparian 
state to inform other riparian states before engaging in any activity or project 
likely to have an impact on water availability; and/or the possibility to 
implement future projects’.  
   2.2 Case law and soft laws 
Case law consolidates the status of the obligation to notify and consult in 
international law. The award of 16 November 1857 by the arbitral tribunal in the 
Lake Lanoux is a typical example.53  The 1957 Arbitral Tribunal in the Lake 
Lanoux case held that: 
[a] State which is liable to suffer repercussions from the work undertaken by 
a neighboring State is the sole judge of its interest; and if the neighboring 
State has not taken the initiative, the other State cannot be denied the right to 
                                           
49 See  Art 4 (1). (a)-(i) SADC revised protocol.  
50 Margaret J. Vick, The Senegal River Basin: A Retrospective and Prospective look at Legal 
Regime, Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 46, p. 213.   
51 Theodore Parnall & Albert E. Utton, ‘The Senegal Valley Authority: A Unique 
Experiment   in International River Basin Planning’, 51 IND.L.J. 235, 237 n.5 (1976) in 
Margaret J. Vick, ‘The Senegal River Basin: A Retrospective and Prospective look at 
Legal Regime’, Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 46, p. 214.   
52 Margaret J. Vick, supra note 50, p. 214.   
53 See Lake Lanoux Arbitration (1957), Spain vs France, 24 I.L.R. 101, 111-12 (hereinafter 
referred as Lake Lanoux Arbitration).  
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insist on notification of works or concessions which are the object of a 
scheme.54 
Issues of notification and consultation were also raised in a dispute between 
India and Pakistan in relation to the Indus River. The controversy is related to 
the Kishanganga Project. This is a hydropower plant constructed in India 
without prior notification and consultation of Pakistan, which diverts water to 
the Jhelum River from the Kishanganga River (called Neelum in Pakistan), a 
tributary of the Jhelum, before entering Pakistan.55 Pakistan was concerned that 
such uses were in breach of the obligations under the Indus Water Treaty –
including the procedural nature as to the timing of notification.56 Due to the 
failure of both states to agree on a mutually satisfactory interpretation of the 
treaty, a case was submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The 
PCA ruled that ‘critical period’ where ‘a culmination of facts-tenders, financing 
secured, government approval in place, and construction underway’ are the key 
stages in the notification process.57   
In addition to the case laws, non-governmental organizations have also 
contributed to the development of the concept of notification and consultation 
on international watercourse. And, one soft law instrument in the field of 
international water law prior to the adoption of the Watercourses Convention by 
the General Assembly in 1997 was ‘the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the 
Water of International Rivers (later substituted by the Berlin Rules of 2004)’. 
The Helsinki Rules’ were adopted by the International Law Association (ILA) 
in 1966 and they were widely accepted and quoted by states and scholars, and, 
hence, considered as reflecting customary international law.58 However, they do 
not have a binding effect per se.59 
The Helsinki Rules provide a requirement for notification and they do not 
distinguish between downstream and upstream riparians. The Helsinki Rules 
require that a state regardless of its location in a drainage basin, should furnish 
to any other basin state, the interests of which may be substantially affected, 
notice of any proposed construction or installation which would alter the regime 
                                           
54 Ibid. 
55 Kishor Uprety & Salman M. A. Salman (2011), supra note 44, p. 646.  
56  Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v India) (Partial Award) (2013) 
available at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1392> (accessed on 04-Mar-
2017).  
57 Alistair Rieu-Clarke (2014), supra note 13, p. 119 citing Indus Waters Kishenganga 
Arbitration (Pakistan v India) (Partial Award) (2013), para 429 available at 
<http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1392> (accessed on 04-Mar-2017). 
58 C. Bourne, International water law; selected writing of Professor Charles Bourne, The 
Hague;  Kluwer Law International in Salman M.A. Salman (2010), supra note 22, p.353.   
59  Ibid.  
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of the basin in a way which might give rise to a dispute. The notice should 
include such essential facts as will permit the recipient to make an assessment of 
the probable effects of the proposed alteration’.60 The Helsinki Rules emphasize 
the requirements of notification regardless of the location of the state in the 
drainage basin.61   
Article XXIX of the 1966 Helsinki Rules suggests that a basin state 
contemplating such an activity: (1) must give notice to the other basin states, 
which (2) are required to examine the situation within a reasonable period of 
time; (3) if no notice has been forthcoming, the new or expanded activity will 
not benefit from the presumption of priority that would normally attach to it 
under Article VIII. These rules are satisfactory in as much as they suggest a duty 
of giving notice and a sanction if that duty is not performed; but ‘they fail to 
provide for any procedure in the event of an objection’.62 
For that reason, the ILA devised some supplementary rules in its 1980 Draft 
Articles on the Regulation of the Flow of Water of International Watercourses. 
These rules may again be summarized in three points: (1) duty of giving 
advance notice; 63 (2) if there are objections, duty to negotiate with a view to 
reaching an agreement; and (3) in the event of a failure of the negotiations, duty 
to seek a solution through the channels of third-party dispute settlement offered 
by the 1966 Helsinki Rules.64  
The requirements of international finance organizations like the World 
Bank65 are also important regarding notification of works along international 
watercourse. According to World Bank internal guidelines, prospective 
borrowers are required to notify the other riparians (both upstream and 
downstream) of the proposed project and its details. The notification contains, to 
the extent available, sufficient technical specifications, information and other 
data (the project details) to enable the other riparians to determine as accurately 
as possible whether the proposed project has the potential for causing 
                                           
60 Article 29 the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Water of International Rivers.   
61 Salman M.A. Salman (2010), supra note 22, p.356. 
62 Lucus Caflisch (1996), Emerging Rules on International Waterways: the Contribution of 
the United Nations, Journal of Political Geography,  Vol. 15, No. ¾, pp. 273-285, p.280.  
63 See Article 7, 1980 Draft Articles on the Regulation of the Flow of Water of International 
Watercourses (herein after Draft Articles on International Watercourse). 
64 See Article 8, Draft Articles on International Watercourse. 
65 The bank issued its first policy for projects on international waterways in 1956. This 
policy was updated and refined in 1965, and was later elaborated in 1985. The current 
version of the policy was issued in 2001 as Operational Policy and Bank Procedures 7.50 
“Projects on International Waterways”). See Samlam M.A. Salman (2011), ‘The Baardhere 
Dam and Water Infrastructure Project in Somalia- Ethiopia’s objection and the World 
Bank response’, Hydrological Sciences Journal, 56:4, 630-640,  
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appreciable harm through water deprivation (whether actual deprivation as in 
the case of downstream riparians, or foreclosure of future uses in the case of 
upstream riparians), or through pollution or otherwise.   
The obligation of the riparian state to inform co-riparian states as a 
customary rule was confirmed by some international lawyers, who stated that 
the riparian state has a ‘duty to give co-riparian state an opportunity to object’ to 
the proposed work in an international watercourse.66 Judge Arechaga, when 
discussing the obligations of riparian states under international law, concluded 
that: 
‘[t]he first of these duties is that any state which proposed the execution of 
works requiring water from a river basin has a duty to give notice of its 
intention to other riparian states. This duty exists even though the state 
proposing to undertake works considers that they will not cause any injury to 
other co-riparian’.67    
Likewise, looking from the perspective of the rights of the other co-riparian 
States, Laylin and Blanchi concluded that: 
 ‘[t]he right to receive appropriate and correct information on the existing 
regime and probable changes to be effected in a common river is coterminous 
with the fundamental duty to respect a riparian’s legitimate interests. No co-
riparian can evaluate the full extent of its rights without such information’.68 
3. Notification and Consultation on Planned Measures under the 
Watercourse Convention  
The UN General Assembly (UNGA) recognized the importance of strengthening 
customary law relating to international watercourses in its Resolution 2669 
(XXV), which was adopted on 8 December 1970.69 Pursuant to the resolution, 
UNGA has mandated the International Law Commission (ILC), a body of 34 
independent legal experts elected by the assembly, to study ‘the non-
                                           
66  In Mohammed Sameh (2003), supra note 11, p. 160. 
67 E. de Arechaga, ‘International Legal Rules Governing Use of Waters from International 
Watercourses’, Inter-American Bar Review 2 (1960) 2, p. 336 in  Mohammed Sameh 
(2003), supra note 11, p. 160. 
68 J. Laylin and R. Blanchi, “The Role of Adjudicating in International River Disputes: The 
Lake Lanoux Case”, AJIL 53 (1959), p. 48  in  Mohammed Sameh (2003), supra note 11, 
p. 160. 
69  On 8 December 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2669 (XXV), which 
requested the International Law Commission to take up the study of the international law 
relating to international watercourses with a view to its codification and progressive 
development. Progressive Development and Codification of the Rules of International 
Laws Relating to International Watercourses, GA Res 2669, UN GAOR, 25th ,supp No. 8, 
UN Doc A/8028(1970).   
138                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 11, No.1                              September 2017  
 
 
navigational uses of international watercourses’.70 The UN Convention on the 
Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, (which was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 21 May 1997, after 23 
years of preparatory work by the ILC, and extensive deliberations by the 
General Assembly thereafter), has come into force on 17 August 2014.71  
   The Watercourses Convention is considered as one of the leading legal 
instruments in relation to non-navigation uses of international water courses. 
There are debates whether the Convention is a reflection of international 
customary law or merely a framework document. To use a comment from one of 
the external assessors of this article:  
There are two lines of arguments in this regard. One line of debate is whether 
the Convention in itself is a reiteration of customary international law, and if 
not, which of its provisions constitute customary international law, and 
which others reflect mere enterprise in progressive development of the law. 
The second line of debate is about form: whether the Convention should be 
organized as a 'framework' document generally composing substantive and 
procedural principles (with a possibility on the part of states to create their 
own treaty arrangements) or whether it should be organized like most other 
conventions which leave no room to states for deviation from their contents.   
The Watercourses Convention (and its ILC Draft) is not very clear regarding the 
nature of the general multilateral convention to be concluded. Is it intended to 
bring about the codification and progressive development of the law of 
international waterways, or to serve as a model or framework agreement, or to 
be something of everything? First, Article 3(l) of the Draft and its commentary 
suggest that the primary intention is that of establishing a framework. 
Accordingly, the multilateral convention would be ‘a set of guidelines for states 
intending to conclude individual watercourse agreements’.72 These states would 
be free, however, to deviate from its provisions, for the individual agreements in 
question shall ‘apply and adjust’ the provisions of the Convention ‘to the 
characteristics and uses of a particular international watercourse or parts 
thereof.’73  
The second line of argument is related with the entry into force of the 
Watercourse Convention upon the deposit of 35 instruments of ratification or 
                                           
70 Ibid.   
 71 See Salman M.A. Salman (2015) ‘Entry into force of the UN Watercourses Convention: 
why should it matter?’, International Journal of Water Resources Development, 31:1, 4-
16, DOI: 10.1080/07900627.2014.952072, p.1.  
72 Lucus Caflisch (1996), ‘Emerging Rules on International Waterways: the Contribution of 
the United Nations’, Journal of Political Geography,  Vol. 15, No. ¾, pp. 273-285, p.276.  
73 Id., p. 277.  
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accession.74 The deposit and the entry into force of the Convention represented 
‘a mere 18 per cent of the organization's current membership of 185 states -- a 
figure that was even lower if regional economic integration organizations were 
taken into account’.75 This indicates that the Convention does not even qualify 
to establish a regional customary international law let alone a general customary 
law applicable at a global level.  
In this regard, Stephen McCaffrey, who acted as special rapporteur during 
the work of the ILC reflected that ‘it may be said with some confidence that the 
most fundamental obligations contained in the [watercourses] Convention do 
indeed reflect customary norms’.76 It should be noted that regardless of the time 
it took for the convention to enter into force, some of its provisions - including 
the no significant harm rule and the equitable utilization principles constitute 
fundamental norms of customary international law.77  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned debate, detailed provisions on 
notification are stipulated in the 1997 Watercourses Convention. In connection 
to the commentary on the draft works of the Watercourse Convention, Stephen 
C. McCaffrey stated that the provisions on planned measures ‘constitutes 
perhaps the most detailed treatment of any subject dealt with in the draft’, 
largely due to “the controversial nature of the obligations involved’.78 Article 11 
lays down the general duty to information concerning planned measures and it 
makes it an obligation to ‘exchange information and consult each other and, if 
                                           
74 The Non-Navigation Uses of International Watercourses (1997) came into force in August 
2014.   
75  Daudi N. Mwakawago (United Republic of Tanzania Representative) remark during the 
General Assembly official adoption of the Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses available at  
    <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/convention_press.html>. The 
parties to the Convention from Europe are: Finland, Norway, Hungary, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Germany, Spain, Greece, France, Denmark, Luxemburg, Italy, 
Monte Negro, the UK, and Ireland. The parties to the Convention from Africa are: South 
Africa, Namibia, Guinea Bissau, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Chad, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco. The Arab states that are parties to the Convention, 
in addition to Libya, Tunisia and Morocco, are Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Qatar. 
Uzbekistan and Vietnam are the only Asian countries to join the Convention; while no 
state from the Americas is yet a party to the Convention. Some of the countries that 
abstained include Ethiopia. See Salman M.A. Salman (2015), supra note 71, p. 13.  
76 SC McCaffrey, ‘The Contribution of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses’ 1(3/4) Intl J Global Envntl Issues 250 at 
259 (2001) in Alistair Rieu-Clarke (2014), supra note 13, p.105.  
77 Salman M.A. Salman (2015), supra note 71, p. 13.  
78 Stephen C. McCaffrey (1992), ‘Background and Overview of the International Law 
Commission's Study of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses’, 
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law and Policy  Vol. 3:17, p. 24.   
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necessary, negotiate on the possible effects of planned measures on the 
condition of an international watercourse’. Moreover, according to Article 12 of 
the Convention, states that are planning to adopt measures that might have 
significant adverse effects on other watercourse states should notify these states, 
and the state of origin shall transmit all appropriate technical data and 
information to the potentially affected watercourse state.  
On the issue of notification of other riparians, the Watercourse Convention 
states that ‘before a watercourse state implements or permits the implementation 
measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse 
states, it shall provide those states with timely notification thereof.’79 Thus, the 
Convention does not solely refer to notification to downstream riparians. Rather, 
it deals with significant effects ‘upon other watercourse states’. Indeed, the 
Watercourse Convention does not mention the terms ‘downstream’ and 
‘upstream’ riparians in any of its provisions.80 It refers throughout its article and 
paragraphs to ‘watercourse states’. It defines ‘watercourse state’ to mean ‘a state 
party to the present Convention in whose territory part of an international 
watercourse is situated…’81 
The 1997 Convention specifically sets out a time limit of six months for a 
reply to be transmitted to the state of origin.82  The states notified pursuant to 
Article 12 will have six months to study and evaluate the possible effects of the 
planned use and to communicate their findings to the notifying state.83  This 
provision provides for the imperative of ensuring the ‘equitable participation of 
all watercourse states in the process of international water law’.84 During the 
six-month period, which can be extended for another six months, that state may 
also be requested to provide additional data and information germane to the 
issue; and the planned use will remain in limbo during that period.85 The 
Watercourse Convention provides that the notifying state shall not, during the 
timeline for the reply to notification86 ‘implement or permit the implementation 
of the planned measures without the consent of the notified states’.87 
                                           
79 See Article 12 Watercourse Convention. 
80 Salman M.A. Salman (2010), supra note 22, p.356. 
81 Id., Art. 2(c), Watercourse Convention.  
82 Id., Art. 12.   
83 Id., Art. 13.    
84 Owen McIntyre (2013) ‘Utilization of shared international freshwater resources – the 
meaning and role of “equity” in international water law’, Water International, 38:2, 112-
129, DOI: 10.1080/02508060.2013.779199, available at <http://www.tandfonline.com> 
p.117. (Accessed on 11-Mar-2017).  
85 See Article 14 Watercourse Convention.  
86 Id., Art. 13.  
87 Id., Art. 14(b). 
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The states notified in accordance with Article 12 may conclude that there is 
no risk, in which case the issue is disposed of. In the contrary event, they shall 
formulate and motivate their objections within the previously mentioned time 
limit.88 If they do, negotiations ensue with a view to reaching an ‘equitable 
resolution of the situation’89 ; that is, presumably, one based on Articles 5-7 of 
the Watercourse Convention. The Convention requires good faith during such 
consultation.90 However, the Watercourse Convention does not impose the co-
riparian states any obligation to negotiate.91  Therefore, it may be concluded that 
entering into negotiation by the concerned states should be agreed upon by the 
concerned states.  
The Watercourses Convention also contains an emergency provision 
allowing watercourse states to implement planned measures immediately, even 
in the presence of objections, if there is an urgent need to do so (for health or 
security reasons, for example).92 But the other watercourse states must be 
informed thereof; the notification procedure described above must be initiated 
immediately afterwards; and the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization, as well as the no-harm rule, will remain in full effect.93 
According to Mohamed S. Amr, failure of the co-riparian state to notify and 
consult with other co-riparian states (regarding the future use of water in an 
international watercourse) constitutes a breach of the obligation under the 
international law governing the non-navigational use of an international 
watercourse.94 However, it will be wrong to assume that the detailed procedural 
rules under Article 12-20 of the Water Course Convention are components of 
customary international rules, which are ‘extremely onerous from the point view 
of the later-coming riparian states, which mostly happen to be upstream 
countries’.95 It is to be noted that the Watercourse Convention does not impose 
any obligation on the co-riparian states to obtain a prior approval from the other 
co-riparian states before implementing such actions.  
                                           
88 Id., Art. 15.  
89 Id., 17(1).    
90 Id., Art.17 (1).  
91
 The ILA Report of 1964 on the “use of international rivers”, did not refer to any obligation 
to enter into negotiations but it considered it sufficient to state that: “parties should seek a 
solution by negotiation.” See Mohamed S. Amr (2003), ‘Diversion of International 
Watercourses under International Law’, African Yearbook of International Law, p. 162.  
92  See Article 19 (1) Watercourse Convention. 
93  Id., Art. 19 (2) (3).  
94  Mohamed S. Amr (2003), supra note 11, p. 162.  
95  A comment the author borrowed from one of the reviewers.  
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4. Riparian State Agreements and Practices with regard to 
Notification and Consultation on Projects along the Nile  
Ethiopia has objected the insertion of the provisions pertaining to notification 
and consultation over planned measures when the text of the Watercourses 
Convention was debated in the Sixth Committee of the UNG.96 The opposition 
clearly relates to the text presented by the ILC and it refers to the detailed 
provisions laid down in Part III of the Watercourses Convention.97 Ethiopia’s 
ground for opposing the detailed rules on notification and consultation was that 
Part III placed ‘an onerous burden upon riparian states’.98   
In spite of considerable opposition to Part III of the Convention, however, 
there was no serious effort to accommodate the interests of upper riparian states. 
Ethiopia abstained during the adoption of the Convention stating that “(t)he 
Convention was tilted towards lower riparian states”, and “while, reserving the 
right to use the water of its international watercourses” Ethiopia opted to abstain  
rather than voting against it in ‘the hope that the Convention might encourage 
negotiations to ensure equitable utilization and promote cooperation’.99 
On the other hand, Sudan adopted the 1997 Water Course Convention while 
Egypt abstained during the adoption of the instrument. This implies that there 
are no inclusive legal provisions regarding notification and consultation on 
planned measures along international watercourse that are equally binding on 
the three riparian states.  Ethiopia’s position on the insertion of the detailed 
provision regarding the notification and consultation on planned measures is its 
negative connotation that it could send to the downstream riparian states, Sudan 
and Egypt. Ethiopia has persistently objected the detailed rules on notification 
and consultation and this renders the principle inapplicable to Ethiopia, unless 
the principle of notification and consultation can be regarded as customary 
international law.   
Ethiopia had signed an agreement with Egypt in 1902, and it was concluded 
between Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia and the British government on behalf 
                                           
96 See, for example, UNGA Sixth Committee, Summary Record of the 20th Meeting, UN 
Doc A/C.6/ 51/SR.20 (1996) at paras 7–55; UNGA Sixth Committee, Summary Record of 
the 53rd Meeting, UN Doc A/C6/51/SR.53 (1997) at paras 39–107. Ultimately, the 
convention was adopted by 106 votes in favor, with thirty-six abstentions, and three votes 
against (Burundi, China, and Turkey). See UNGA, Official Records of the 99th Plenary 
Meeting of the 51st Session, UN Doc A/51/PV.99 (1997) at 7–8 available at 
<http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/convention_press.html>. See 
also Alistair Rieu-Clarke (2014), supra note 13, p. 107.  
97 UNGA Sixth Committee, supra note 102, at para 7. 
98 Id., at para  9. 
99 Ibid.  
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of Egypt and Sudan.100  Article III of, the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty (May 15, 
1902) provides: 
His Majesty the Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia, engages himself towards 
the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be 
constructed, any works across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana or the Sabot, which 
would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile except in agreement with 
His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Sudan (italic 
added). 
This agreement that laid the foundation for the May 1902 agreement was ‘the 
negotiations carried out at the  final years of the 19th century and the diplomatic 
notes exchanged in March 1902 between Monsieur Alfred Ilg, Emperor 
Menelik’s foreign affairs counsellor, and Lt. Colonel John Harrington, the 
British emissary in Addis Ababa’.101 The March 1902 exchanges of notes 
contain ‘an article which established limitations on future rights of Ethiopia in 
the utilization of the Nile River water sources’.102  
The May 1902 Treaty provides ‘restrictions on construction of dams across 
the Blue Nile, Lake Tana or Sobat without the prior consent of the British 
Government of Sudan’.103 Based on these treaty instruments, Egypt has always 
threatened Ethiopia that it cannot construct any dam that could affect the size of 
the Nile River which it deems is Egypt’s lifeline.104 In other words, any attempt 
by Ethiopia to construct a dam should not affect the size of the Nile, a condition 
which is “analogous to the unenforceable ‘verdict’ (in Shakespeare’s Merchant 
of Venice) which entitled Shylock to take a pound of Antonio’s flesh without 
spilling a drop of blood”.105  
Ethiopia has persistently objected that it does not accept the March 1902 
exchange of notes. Ethiopia also argues that the May 1902 agreement, only 
                                           
100 In 1902, London dispatched John Harrington to Addis Ababa to negotiate border and 
Nile water issues with Emperor Menelik. See Tadesse Kassa (2014), ‘the Anglo 
Ethiopian Treaty on the Nile and the Tana Dam Concessions: A script in legal history of 
Ethiopia’s Diplomatic confront (1900-1956)’, Mizan Law Review, Vol.8, no.2, 2014, 
p.273. 
101 Harold G. Marcus (1995), The Life and Times of Menelik II, Ethiopia 1844- 1913, New 
Jersey: The Red Sea Press Inc., p. 59 in Tadesse Kassa (2014), supra note 100, p.273.  
102 See Ilg to Harrington, 18 March 1902, FO 403/322 in Tadesse Kassa (2014), supra note 
100, p.275. 
103  Tadesse Kassa (2014), supra note 100, p.278. 
104 Gebre Tsadik Degefu, ‘The Nile Waters: Moving Beyond Gridlock’, Addis Tribune (June 
25, 2004) in Fasil Amdesion (2009), Scrutinizing the Scorpion Problematique: 
Arguments in Favor of the Continued Relevance of International Law and a 
Multidisciplinary Approach to Resolving the Nile Dispute, Texas International Journal, 
Vol. 44:1, Texas, USA, 2009,p. 10. 
105 Elias N. Stebek, email exchanges, Aug. 31, 2017.  
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prohibits the complete arrest of the water. In fact, Ethiopia has not ratified the 
treaty or exchange notes.106 The restriction on dam was annexed to the major 
treaty body through a note exchange between the advisor of Emperor Menilik 
and British Envoy in Ethiopia.107 Although, the advisor has not been authorized 
to sign a treaty agreement, scholars and politicians in favor of Egypt’s claim 
have taken for granted that such unauthorized note is binding treaty agreement.  
Ethiopia has discarded the historical rights that Egypt advances based on 
colonial Treaty. Instead, Ethiopia has expressed its support to the principle of 
equitable use of all riparian states of the Nile River. Ethiopia has always rejected 
the request for notification of any of its Nile projects, claiming that the hidden 
objective of Egypt’s demand is to claim (after it is notified) that the 1902 
Agreement is valid and binding on Ethiopia.108 To use the comments from one 
of the reviewers: ‘Ethiopia may not have come forthwith to support the principle 
of notification and consultation, but it has never been an ardent opponent of the 
approach, if such is based on mutual recognition of equality’. Furthermore, 
Ethiopia contends that Egypt and Sudan had never notified Ethiopia of any of 
their projects across the Nile basin.109   
Other important instruments on the use of the Nile waters are the 1929 and 
1959 Nile water agreements. The 1929 agreement110 was signed between Egypt 
and Great Britain on behalf of Sudan and other British colonies in the basin 
(Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania).111 The 1929 Treaty did not allow upper 
riparians to ‘alter the Niles flow without obtaining consent first from the 
U.K’.112 The second Nile Water Agreement, commonly called the 1959 
Agreement, is aimed at the full utilization of the Nile Waters solely between 
                                           
106  Tadesse Kassa (2014), supra note 100, p. 275 
107  Bentinck, Lake Tana, 12 December 1927, FO 371/12341 Addis Ababa in Tadesse Kassa 
(2014), supra note 100 , p. 276. 
108  Salman M.A. Salman (2016), ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: the Road to the 
Declaration of Principles and the Khartoum Document’, Water International, 41:4 512-
527, DOI: 10.1080/02508060.2016.1170374.  
109  Ibid. 
110  The 1929 treaty is remarkably one-sided, demonstrating, the British desire to appease 
Egypt in order to secure the shortest sea-route to British-controlled India via the Suez and 
the Red Sea ports.  
111  David. S (2010), Nile Basin Relations: Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, George Washington 
University Press, Washington DC, USA, 2010, p.6, available at   
<http://www.mailto:elliott.org> (accessed on 19-Mar-17) 
112 Joseph W. Dellapenna (1994), ‘Treaties as Instruments for managing Internationally 
shared water resource: restricted sovereignty v. community of property’, 26 Case 
W. Res. J. Int'l L. 27, 48 (1994). 
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Egypt and Sudan.113 The two parties under the 1959 agreement agreed that 
Egypt constructs the Sudd-el-Aali and Sudan shall construct ‘the Roseires Dam 
on the Blue Nile and any other works which the Republic of Sudan considers 
essential for the utilization of its share, and including projects for the increase of 
the River yield’.114 Ethiopia was not a party to both the 1929 and 1959 
agreements, and hence could not be bound by the terms of those agreements. 
Ethiopia has expressly objected the bilateral negotiations between Egypt and 
Sudan on the allocation of the Nile waters, and to the Aswan High Dam in 
Egypt, and to the Roseiris Dam in the Sudan in the late 1950s.115 Thus, the 
provisions included in both agreements that demand other Nile river riparian 
states including Ethiopia to obtain prior consent of Egypt and Sudan are not 
applicable.   
Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan had signed the 1968 African Convention on the 
Protection of Nature and natural Resource (ACPNW). The Convention requires 
the contracting states to coordinate the planning and development of water 
resources projects, to consult with each other thereon, and to set up inter-state 
commission to study and resolve problems arising from the joint use of these 
resources, and for the joint development and conservation of such resources. 116 
Moreover, in relation to development plans, the ACPNW states that ‘where any 
development plan is likely to affect the nature of resources of other states, the 
latter shall be consulted’.117 The ACPNW can be taken as the only instrument 
that the disputant parties involved in the on-going construction of GERD are 
part of. Yet, Ethiopia has not ratified the ACPNW agreement; hence, it is not a 
binding legal instrument as far as Ethiopia’s legal obligation is concerned.  
On the other hand, there is bilateral state practice regarding notification and 
objection that involved Ethiopia as one of the parties in the construction of a 
Baardhere Dam and water infrastructure project in Somalia. The Baardhere Dam 
was supposed to be built with the financial backing of the World Bank along the 
Juba River, which Somalia shares with Ethiopia and Kenya.118 As a result, 
                                           
113 Ana Elisa Cascão (2009), Changing Power Relations in the Nile River Basin: 
Unilateralism vs. Cooperation?, King’s College of London Press, United Kingdom, 
2009, p. 2, Available at: <http://www.wateralternatives.org>. (Accessed: 10/11/2014). 
114 See 1959 Nile Water Agreement. 
115 Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, ‘The Blue Nile and Its Basins: An Issue of International 
Concern’, in From Poverty to Development: Intergenerational Transfer of Knowledge, 
IGTK Consultation Paper Series, No. 2 at 2-3 (Shiferaw Bekele ed., 2006);  Gebre 
Tsadik Degefu, The Nile Waters: Moving Beyond Gridlock, ADDIS TRIB. (June 25, 
2004) in Fasil Amdesion (2009), supra note 103, p. 21.  
116 African Convention on the Protection of Nature and natural Resource Art. 5(2) (herein 
after African Nature Convention) 
117 See Art. 14 (3) of the African Nature Convention. 
118  Samlam M.A. Salman (2011), supra note 65, p.631.  
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Ethiopia and Kenya were duly notified and provided with the detailed 
specification of the project.119 However, Ethiopia opposed to the project on the 
grounds that the project would cause ‘adverse effects to its interests’. 120  The 
Government of Ethiopia suggested prior negotiations with Somalia concerning 
the use of the waters of the Juba River, with the view of reaching an agreement 
that would be mutually satisfactory to both riparian states.121 Ethiopia went 
further and suggested negotiations with Somalia to determine the amount of 
water of the Juba that each country would be allocated.122 This indicates that 
Ethiopia has accepted (at least in this particular project) that notification and 
consultation for mutual benefits in the context of equitable utilization constitutes 
an international norm regarding the construction of developmental projects 
along a transboundary watercourse. And, it was done in the absence of sharing 
and managing agreements among the three riparian states.123  
Moreover, in 1993, a framework agreement on the Nile water was signed 
between Ethiopia and the Arab Republic of Egypt. One of the substantive 
provisions of the agreement relates with ‘consultation and cooperation on 
projects that are mutually advantageous, such as projects that would enhance the 
volume of flow and reduce the loss of the Nile water through comprehensive 
and integrated development schemes’.124 In the same manner, the framework 
agreement stipulates that the parties agreed that they should hold periodic 
consultation on matters of mutual concern, including the Nile waters, in a 
manner that would enable them to work together for peace and stability in the 
region. In addition to the lack of specificity regarding specific obligations, the 
1993 framework agreement has not been ratified by either of the governments. 
                                           
119  Ibid. 
120  It is the policy of the World Bank not to finance any project that will cause appreciable 
harm to any other riparian. Similarly, the Bank was not able to finance the Aswan High 
Dam in Egypt, because, among other reasons, of the initial failure of Egypt and the 
Sudan to reach an agreement over the Nile River, particularly in light of the fact that the 
Aswan High Dam would inundate large areas in northern Sudan. It must be noted that 
neither Egypt and Sudan as well as the World Bank invited Ethiopia to be notified and 
consulted on the project.  Samlam M.A. Salman (2011), supra note 65,  p.631.   
121  Ibid. 
122  Ibid.  
123  The Juba River is fed by three main tributaries: the Genale, the Wabe Gestro and the 
Dawa, which originate in Ethiopia, with the Dawa becoming a boundary river with 
Kenya. These rivers converge at Dolo, near the Somali borders with Kenya and Ethiopia, 
forming the main Juba River. See Capondera, D.A., 2003, National and International 
water law and administration-selected writings. The Hague: Kluwer Law International in   
Samlam M.A. Salman (2011), supra note 65, p.637.  
124  Article 6 of the 1993 Agreement.  
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Post 1993 framework agreement rather demonstrate wilful refusal to observe 
the duty of communication and consultations of planned measures. For example, 
Egypt failed to consult or alert Ethiopia on the development project known as 
the Toshka or new valley project along the Nile River. Ethiopia objected to the 
project on 20 March 1997 via the Note Verbale which, Ethiopia stated; 
“Ethiopia wishes to be on record as having made it unambiguously clear that it 
will not allow its share to the Nile waters to be affected by a fait accompli such 
as the Toshka project, regarding which it was neither consulted nor alerted.” 125 
Ethiopia had lobbied against the same project, by sending several letters to 
international institutions.126    
Ethiopia and many riparian states other than Egypt and Sudan have been 
engaged in pursuits of replacing the colonial treaty agreements (that do not bind 
them) by a multilateral treaty agreement, i.e., the “Cooperative Framework 
Agreement (CFA)” that guarantees equitable utilization of the Nile water 
resources.127  The CFA disproved Egypt’s claim as the sole powerhouse for any 
discussion on the Nile basin, and it was adopted in 2010. The CFA formally 
introduced the concept of riparian duty to inform on planned measures. The 
CFA stipulates the principle that ‘the Nile basin states shall exchange on 
planned measures through the Nile River Basin Commission’.128 However, 
Sudan and Egypt failed to sign the CFA, and it has not come into effect.  
The principle of planned measures has been one of the most difficult issues 
throughout the CFA negotiations. The original negotiated draft of CFA 
incorporated the procedural rules of the Watercourse Convention, which was 
supported at the time by all parties, except Ethiopia as a ‘persistent objector’ to 
its introduction.129 Ethiopia’s objection to the rules stated that the issue of 
planned measures could be attended to under the regular exchange of data and 
information. In addition, it suggested that the issue of planned measures 
becomes ‘relevant if and only if a water sharing arrangement acceptable to the 
basin states is put in place’.130 The rules of procedure on planned measures were 
                                           
125 Salman M.A. Salman (2010), supra note 22, p. 352.   
126 Hala Nasra and Andreas Neef (2016), Ethiopia’s Challenges to Egyptian Hegemony in 
the Nile River Basin: the Case of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam, Geopolitical, 
214, 969-989, DOI:10.1080/14650045.2016.1209740 , p. 978. 
127 Eshetu Girma, Egypt vs. Ethiopia at the ICJ Part, 2014, p.10 . 
<http://aigaforum.com/articles/Ethiopia-vs-Egypt_and_ICJ.pdf> , Accessed: Dec.12, 
2016.  
128  Article 8 of CFA.  
129 Musa Mohammed Abseno (2013), ‘Role and relevance of the 1997 UN Watercourses 
Convention in resolving transboundary water disputes in the Nile’, International Journal 
of River Basin Management, 11:2, 193-203, DOI: 10.1080/15715124.2013.811415, p. 
199, available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/trbm20> (accessed on 11-Mar-17). 
130 PoE Final Report, 2000, p. 17. 
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later removed from the text and replaced by a statement of principle in the 
current CFA text, leaving procedural details to the future Nile River Basin 
Commission.131 While the Watercourse Convention provides detailed 
procedures on prior notification, consultation, and negotiation concerning 
‘planned measures’, the CFA chose to adopt a general principle that can enable 
the Nile basin states exchange information on planned measures through the 
Nile River Basin Commission thereby leaving detailed procedures for the future 
Nile River Basin Commission.132 Therefore, information on planned programs 
pursuant to Article 8 would not be directly between the party of origin and the 
‘affected states’ as such. 
Consequently, the Watercourse Convention and the final outcome of the 
CFA regarding the procedures concerning planned measures are different. The 
framework adopts a less detailed principle that only requires: 
 ‘the regular and reciprocal exchange among states of the Nile River Basin of 
readily available and relevant data and information on existing measures and 
on the condition of water resources of the basin, where possible in a form 
that facilitates its utilization by the states to which it is communicated’.133 
In March 2015, the three riparian states signed an agreement entitled 
‘Agreement on Declaration of Principles between the Arab Republic of Egypt, 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and the Republic of the Sudan on 
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (DoP on the GERD)’. The 
Agreement has 10 principles, four of which are about the GERD.  Relevant to 
the discussion to the subject at hand, Article 3 obliges ‘the three parties to take 
all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm’.  
Article 5 deals with the principle to cooperate in the first filling and operation 
of the dam. Article 7 addresses the issue of exchange of data and information 
between the three parties for carrying out the studies recommended by the panel, 
and to be carried out by the Technical National Committee. According to the 
Declaration of Principles (DoP) of GERD, Ethiopia retained the right to adjust 
these rules and ‘inform downstream countries of any unforeseen or urgent 
circumstances’ that has led to such adjustment.134 The aforementioned 
agreement at least puts the framework on notification and consultation of 
information on the construction of the dam, and it can be concluded that it is the 
only agreement that has somehow taken the importance of notification and 
consultation during the construction of the GERD.  
                                           
131 Musa Mohammed Abseno (2013), supra note 129, p. 199. 
132  Ibid. 
133 Art. 7, CFA, 2010. 
134 Hala Nasra and Andreas Neef (2016), supra note 126, p.978. 
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In a recent development in connection with sixth year anniversary of the 
commencement of the GERD, a higher government official asserted that ‘the 
overall filling of the Dam will be conducted in consultation (not necessarily in 
agreement) with Egypt and Sudan (emphasis added)’.135 However, there is no 
need to consult Egypt and Sudan on the initial stage of producing electricity 
(750 MW) as the amount of water required to produce hydroelectric energy is 
small and the impact on downstream riparian states is negligible.136 By strictly 
adhering to the consistent Ethiopian position of the non-obligatory nature of 
notification and consultation on planned measures and ongoing constructions, 
Ethiopia’s state practice confirms that the practice emanates solely from 
confidence building measures among the riparian parties.     
5. The GERD and Riparian Duty to Inform and Consult on 
Planned Measures: Application and Challenges  
The US Bureau of Reclamation (between 1956-1964) conducted the GERD 
initial project study on behalf of the then government of Ethiopia that identified 
four potential dam sites on the Blue Nile, including the one, which has now 
become the location of the GERD.137 Subsequently, the current government of 
Ethiopia carried out the survey at the site in October 2009 and in August 
2010.138 The original design planned by the US Bureau of Reclamation was 
revised and made public on 31 March 2011.139 Ethiopia began the GERD 
construction project in 2011; it has a planned full supply elevation of 640 m and 
will create 74 BCM of reservoir storage and the addition of 6450 MW140 of 
installed generation capacity to the approximately 6833 MW that currently 
exists within the basin.  
                                           
135  GERD in its completion of the first stage is almost ready to produce electricity’  
Ethiopian Amharic Reporter newspaper, ( 01, March 2017), available at  
<http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/content> ( Debretsion Gebremichael, member of the 
national GERD public participation coordination assembly, claimed in an interview with 
Ethiopian Amharic newspaper, the Reporter)  
136 Ibid. The reservoir is assumed to fill during the initial year (2016) to 560 m (3.58 BCM) 
to test the first two installed turbines and remain at that elevation until the start of the 
second-year flood period (2017).   
137  Yohannes Yihdego, Alamgir Khalil & Hilmi S. Salem (2017),  ‘Nile River’s Basin 
Dispute: Perspectives of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)’, Global 
Journal of Human Social Sciences (B), Volume XVII Issue II Version I, p.4 
138 Ibid.  
139 Ibid.  
140 GERD in its completion of the first stage is almost ready to produce electricity’  
Ethiopian Amharic Reporter newspaper, ( 01, March 2017), available at   
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The Ethiopian government officially announced the commencement of the 
GERD in April 2011. The announcement marked the end to Ethiopia’s 
exclusion from the utilization of the Nile or ‘Abay’ by the downstream 
countries.  Ethiopia has stated that the GERD will not pose any significant harm 
on the rights of riparian States to use the Nile River.141  Moreover, the Ethiopian 
government has undertaken pre-feasibility plan. Sudan has, in due course, 
expressed its support stating that the GERD will reduce loss of water due to 
evaporation. However, Egypt demanded that Ethiopia shall formally notify it 
and make available all information and allow time for response by Egypt and 
Sudan before the commencement and continuation of the GERD.  
Ethiopia has rejected the request for notification for any of its Nile projects. 
It contends that “Egypt and Sudan never notified Ethiopia of any of their 
projects on Nile”.142 Regarding the pre-feasibility plan, Egypt expressed its 
disagreement stating that the ‘actual size of the GERD was larger than what has 
been promised under the pre-feasibility plan’.143  Egypt alleges that the GERD 
will adversely affect its rights to the Nile River. Ethiopia, on the other hand, 
insists that downstream countries would rather benefit from the production and 
export of electricity as the result of the GERD project.  
One of the challenges in the application of notification and consultation 
regarding the GERD is the lack of an all-inclusive legal regime governing the 
Nile water.  To date, there is no single legal document that Ethiopia, Sudan and 
Egypt can rely on to trigger notification and consultation. As indicated earlier, 
Ethiopia and Egypt have abstained from adopting the 1997 watercourse 
Convention. Therefore, the Watercourse Convention does not apply within the 
context of GERD regarding the duty to notify and consult as far as the three 
riparian states.  
Ethiopia has signed and ratified the Cooperative Framework Agreement 
(CFA). The CFA has incorporated a provision on notification and consultation. 
The CFA states that there is a duty to exchange information on planned 
measures. However, Ethiopia owes no obligation to notify and consult its 
planned measure to Egypt and Sudan as they have refused to sign and ratify the 
CFA. Even if the CFA provision on exchange of information on planned 
measures had been agreed upon among the disputant parties in the on-going 
                                           
141  A report released by an International Commission, which included representatives from 
Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan in August 2014, found that GERD would have a minimal 
impact on Egypt’s water access. see Hala Nasra and Andreas Neef (2016), supra note 
126, p.978. 
142 Salman M.A. Salman (2016), supra note 108, p.520.  
143  Rawia Tawfik (2016), ‘The Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam: a benefit-sharing project 
in the Eastern Nile’, Water International, 41:4, 574-592:  
     10:108010250860.2016.1170397, p. 575. See also Article 5 of the DoP.   
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GERD controversy, the inadequacy and lack of details on notification and 
consultation would have been a challenge. This challenge necessitates an 
additional protocol agreement that lays down detailed stipulations on 
notification and consultation.   
Unlike the Statute of Uruguay River and the Indus Water Treaty, the 
Agreement on Declaration of the Principles (DoP) on the GERD is not helpful, 
as it does not include a resort to arbitration or ICJ. In this connection, the 
challenging part in any future consultation and understanding with regard to the 
institutional set-up towards amicably resolving possible disagreements and 
disputes (on the likely impact of the GERD on downstream countries) is bound 
to stay in limbo.  
The DoP requires Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt to settle any dispute arising out 
of the interpretation or implementation of the agreement amicably through 
consultation or negotiation in accordance with the principle of good faith.144 A 
problem arises regarding the remedies available if the parties are unable to settle 
their disputes through negotiation. Resort to arbitration or judicial settlement is 
not embodied in the Declaration of the Principles (DoP). Nor can these 
mechanisms be initiated unilaterally. Therefore, one may conclude, that, lack of 
a compulsory dispute settlement body in the DoP renders consultation and 
negotiation a non-binding tool which can only facilitate confidence building. 
Conclusion 
The riparian duty to inform on planned measures is a growing norm of 
international law which is already gaining support through bilateral and 
multilateral agreements as well as state practice. As discussed in this article, the 
pronouncement of the ICJ and the PCA indicate the development of 
international law on notification and consultation, which is regarded as an 
integral part of the duty of a state not to cause significant harm on another 
riparian state. However, no customary law norm is established regarding the 
detail components of notification and consultation, and whether the project is 
interrupted until the other riparian states give their consent.  
The duty to notify planned measures prior to their commencement and the 
suspension of the project until riparian states give their consent can only be 
claimed based on bilateral agreement or multilateral agreement, but not on the 
basis of customary international law which is not applicable in the context of 
GERD. Both Ethiopia and Egypt are not party to the UN Watercourse 
Convention; hence the specific procedures required under the Convention 
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regarding the timing of consultations, suspension of planned projects, and the 
dispute settlement mechanisms therein do not bind both countries.  
The 1902 agreement is the only treaty agreement, which Egypt, as successor 
of the British Empire in Egypt, may invoke. However, the 1902 treaty, if it still 
applies unhindered by fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic 
stantibus), restricts complete stoppage as can be inferred from the phrase “arrest 
the free flow of water”. This treaty is not relevant to the GERD, a hydro dam, 
which does not arrest the free flow of water to the downstream countries. On the 
contrary, Ethiopia, as a member of the CFA, has assumed the legal commitment 
to the principle of equitable use and causing no significant harm to a riparian 
State.  Even if any provision in the 1902 Treaty had been relevant, the Vienna 
UN Convention on the Law of Treaties renders the Treaty null owing to 
fundamental change of circumstances.    
State practice involving notification and consultation exhibits different 
practices. Egypt has, on various occasions, failed to consult Ethiopia in its 
projects thereby rendering the notification and consultation procedures 
inapplicable between the two states. Egypt, has, until recently refused to 
recognize the right of the upstream Ethiopia to have its fair share of benefits 
from the shared watercourse. And, it does not have the justification to ask 
Ethiopia to follow the notification and consultation procedures when Egypt has 
failed to do so in the past.  
There are thus challenges to invoke the principles of notification and 
consultation within the context of GERD. The absence of all-inclusive 
international water agreements that involve all disputant parties in the GERD 
has made the application of the principles very challenging. And as indicated 
above, the Agreement on the Declaration of Principles (DoP) by Ethiopia, 
Sudan, and Egypt, does not avail a dispute settlement scheme beyond 
negotiation. 
The way forward for possible coordination in upcoming development projects 
is the need to agree on a mutually acceptable procedural requirement of 
notification and consultation. The best option is for Egypt and Sudan to sign the 
CFA. Ethiopia should also expand the scope of Articles 7 and 8 of the CFA that 
only limits/restricts the duty ‘to exchange information on planned measures’ and 
address the concerns of the downstream Sudan and Egypt. Moreover, the Nile 
Basin Commission could be entrusted with the task of formulating a 
supplementary independent protocol that exclusively deals with notification, 
consultation and, if possible, negotiation procedures based on lessons drawn 
from the rules of similar basin commissions.                                                       ■  
